May 30, 2016: Giorgio Sbardolini: Two-Dimensional Russell Paradox
Giorgio Sbardolini (University of Ohio)
Two-Dimensional Russell Paradox
May 30, 2016: h. 10.30-12.30.
Room: Sala Enzo Paci, Directorate of Department of Philosophy.
Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano
The talk will be held in English.
Participation is strongly recommended to students of the Doctoral School in Philosophy and Human Sciences.
Attendance is free. All welcome.
I will present (what appears to be) a version of Russell's paradox in two-dimensional modal logic. That is, there is a reductio argument that is structurally identical to Russell's paradox, following from apparently natural assumptions that can be formulated in a two-dimensional modal logic of the type underlying Kaplan's logic of indexicals, or Stalnaker's metasemantic account of assertion. As usual, the question is: what is this a reductio of? In order to approach this question, I will discuss Prior's paradox: an apparently closely related contradiction that belongs to an underinvestigated class of puzzles, known as "paradoxes of intensionality."