May 23, 2016: Sebastiano Moruzzi: Deflationary Pluralism
Sebastiano Moruzzi (Università degli Studi di Bologna)
May 23, 2016: h. 10.30-12.30.
Room Enzo Paci, Directorate of the Dipartment of Philosophy.
Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano
The Talk will be held in English.
Participation is strongly recommended to students of the Doctoral School in Philosophy and Human Sciences.
Attendance is free. All welcome.
(joint work with Filippo Ferrari) We explore the possibility of an alethic pluralistic view that includes, among the plurality of ways of being true, a deflationary truth property for the domain of basic taste. Crispin Wright has advanced two arguments purported to show that truth is a distinctively normative notion—i.e. a notion whose normative guidance contrasts with that of epistemic justification. The intended conclusion is that in virtue of its normative nature, truth cannot be as a metaphysically innocent property as deflationists take it to be. To make the case for the possibility of a deflationary property alongside other, more substantive, truth properties, we need to show that Wright’s anti-deflationary arguments can be locally blocked. This means that, although we concede to Wright that as a general conception of truth deflationism is unviable—for the reasons highlighted by the two arguments—a local deflationary truth property can be rehabilitated. We show how this can be done by focusing on the domain of basic taste.
There, we argue, truth is purely deflationary and normatively indistinguishable from justification (but yet not identical to it).