June 27, 2017: Workshop: Minimal Shared Agency
Minimal Shared Agency
June 27, 2017, h. 9:30 a.m.
Sala Enzo Paci, Direzione del Dipartimento di Filosofia, via Festa del Perdono, 7.
This is an informal and unimi-internal work-in-progress workshop where we discuss paper draft on "minimal shared agency". The speakers are glad about getting feedback on these drafts in the discussions after their talks.
Please email firstname.lastname@example.org to register for that event and to receive the literature in advance.
9:30-10.30: Francesco Guala (Milan): The Cognitive Basis of Institutions
10.30-11.30: Corrado Sinigaglia (Milan): What Do We Experience of Actions When We Act Together with a Purpose?
(co-author: Stephen Butterfill, Warwick)
12.00-13.00: Santiago Arango Munoz (Antioquia): Group Metamemory: Does Collaborative Memory Imply Group Metacognition?
(co-author: Kourken Michaelian, Dunedin)
Corrado Sinigaglia (University of Milan) and Stephen Butterfill (University of Warwick): What Do We Experience of Actions When We Act Together with a Purpose?
Acting together with a purpose is a familiar feature of everyday life. We jump together, play music together and move tables together. But what do we experience of actions in acting together? It is perhaps tempting to suppose that there is a special way in which we can experience our own actions, and that we cannot experience the actions of others in this way. This view would imply that in acting together, our own actions are experienced in a way that our partners’ actions are not. However recent research on motor co-representation suggests that, in observing another act, it may be possible to experience her actions in whatever sense we can experience our own actions. This together with recent findings about motor co-representation in joint action makes it at least conceivable that in acting together we can experience the actions each of us performs. Just here a challenge arises. Seen from the outside, the actions of individuals acting with a purpose are not merely several actions: they are collectively directed to an outcome. The challenge is to understand how the collective directedness of the actions could be reflected in experience. In this chapter we attempt to meet the challenge.
Francesco Guala (University of Milan): The Cognitive Basis of Institutions
A great deal of human coordination takes place in institutional settings. Although it is generally agreed that the main function of institutions is to facilitate coordination, it is not clear exactly how they do it. In this chapter I will address this issue from a game-theoretic perspective, focusing in particular on the formation of common beliefs that sustain equilibrium selection. I will explore the idea that conventions create normative expectations, that such expectations elicit behavioural responses with minimal computational effort, and that they make the formation of common beliefs largely redundant.
Santiago Arango-Muñoz (University of Antioquia) and Kourken Michaelian (University of Otago): Group metamemory: Does collaborative remembering imply group metacognition?