December 12, 2018: Alon Chasid: Truth-Neutral Perceptual Experience
Alon Chasid (Bar-Ilan University)
Truth-Neutral Perceptual Experience
December 12, 2018, h. 15:30-17:30.
Room Enzo Paci, Directorate of the Department of Philosophy, Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano.
A commonly discussed feature of perceptual experience is that it has phenomenal force: it purports to reveal something about the world. In this sense, perceptual experience is truth-committal. In this talk, I will start by discussing different descriptions of this feature, and I will adopt a relatively minimal characterization of it, according to which a perceptual experience is truth-committal just in case it inclines the perceiver to believe its content. I will then introduce cases where visual experiences are truth-neutral: i.e. they have no phenomenal force. Some of these experiences are garden-variety: they may arise when the perceiver has robust evidence that her visual experience is non-veridical. Other truth-neutral experiences arise in specific contexts, e.g., in looking at a picture and experiencing the object it depicts, or in watching a visual work of fiction such as a play or a movie. Next, I will argue that what renders visual experience truth-neutral in those cases is that it is penetrated by belief-like imaginings. I will conclude by explaining why it is that when belief-like imaginings—as opposed to beliefs—penetrate visual experience, they render it truth-neutral.
The Lecture will be held in English.
Participation is strongly recommended to students of the Doctoral School in Philosophy and Human Sciences.
Everyone interested is welcome to attend.
Conference organized by Anna Ichino, PhD